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et al.: Appeal and Error--Certification to Supreme Court of Appeals--Nece
RECENT CASES

RECENT CASES
APPEAL AND ERROR-OERTIICATION TO SUPREmE COURT OF ApPEALs-NEcESSITY FOR DECREE IN LowFR COURT PAssiNG UPON
SUFFMCIENCY OF PLEnDNG.-Solely upon a vacation order awarding an injunction, a cause was certified to the Supreme Court of
Appeals upon questions as to the sufficiency of the bill and exhibits. Held, that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to entertain such an inquiry in the absence of an order or decree of the
lower court rendered in term and based upon a plea or demurrer
regularly putting in issue the sufficiency of the bill. City of Wheeling v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company of West Vir"ginia,94 S. E. 511 (W. Va. 1917).
In the absence of a statute so providing, an appeal cannot be
taken from an interlocutory order or decree. Harris v. Hauser,
26 W. Va. 595 (1885) ; Hannah v. Bank, 53 W. Va. 82, 44 S. E.
152 (1903). Hence, an order merely sustaining a demurrer to a
bill, being interlocutory in nature, in the absence of a statute, cannot constitute the basis of an appeal. Bosworth v. Wilson, 57 W.
Va. 80, 49 S. E. 942 (1905). It is otherwise, however, if the order
not only sustains the demurrer but also dismisses the bill, as such
an order is final. Norris v. Lemen, 28 W. Va. 336 (1886). An order overruling a demurrer to a bill is interlocutory and therefore
not appealable. Parsons v. Snider, 42 W. Va. 517, 26 S. E. 285
(1896). Prior to the AcTs of 1915, the West Virginia statute had
already extended the field of appellate jurisdiction to numerous
classes of interlocutory orders and decrees. W. VA. CODE, 1913
c. 135, § 1; Carskadon v. Board of Education, 61 W. Va. 468, 56
S. E. 834 (1906). It was not, however, until the ACTS of 1915, c. 69,
that appellate relief was allowed as to interlocutory orders and
decrees of the nature mentioned, rfling upon the sufficiency of
pleadings. BARimS' W. VA. CODE, 1916, c. 135, § 1. While the
amendment made by AcTs of 1915 enlarges the field of appellate
jurisdiction as to interlocutory orders and decrees determining the
sufficiency of pleadings, it in no way affects or extends the powers
or method of.the trial court, or judge thereof in vacation, in passing upon the sufficiency of pleadings. In other words, the amendment relates to appellate, and not to trial procedure. Hence,
neither before nor after the amendment is made, does a judge have
power to enter an order or decree in vacation, unless so authorized
by statute. Kinports et a. v. Rawson et al., 29 W. Va. 487, 2 S.
E. 85 (1887). Therefore, the principal case holds, although a de-
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murrer to the bill might perhaps have been tendered in vacation,
still the issue raised by the demurrer could have been decided only
by the court in term. Granting the injunction over the objection of
the defendant was, in effect, tentative approval of the sufficiency
of the bill; but it was not a judicial determination of its sufficiency
as a legal proposition in pleading. To ask the Supreme Court to
pass upon the mere propriety of having granted the injunction was
to ask it to exercise a supervisory, not an appellate, jurisdiction;
to prejudge, rather than to review, the action of the lower court.
The defendant, however, had a remedy which was practically theequivalent of a demurrer in vacation. The statute allows an appeal from an order overruling a motion to dissolve an injunction.
W. VA. CODE, c. 135, § 1. A motion to dissolve an injunction,
based on the bill alone and without an answer having been filed
to the bill, is the practical equivalent of a demurrer to the bill.
Hyre v. Hoover et al., 3 W. Va. 11 (1868). Even prior to the AcTs
of 1915, the defendant, having made a motion in vacation to dissolve the injunction, could have appealed immediately by the
regular process of appeal from an adverse ruling of the court
thereon, and appellate relief would have been granted. The absence of an answer would have eliminated any question of fact, thus
casting the decision upon a pure question of law as involving the
sufficiency of the allegations of the bill. All this is assuming, of
course, that the defendant is the party seeking appellate relief.
DEEDS--ACKNOWLEDGMENT-HuSBAND
AND WIF.-A husband
held the legal title to land in trust for the use and benefit of his
wife. The husband and wife, in the same deed, but with no description either in the deed or in the certificate of acknowledgment
showing the relationship of husband and wife, conveyed the land
to a third party. Held, (Poffenbarger, J., dissenting), that the
deed and acknowledgment were sufficient. Wehrle v. Price et al.,
94 S. E. 477 (W. Va. 1917).
At common law, a married woman could not convey her real
property by grant. Rosenour v. Rosenour, 47 W. Va. 554, 35 S. E.
918 (1900) ; Ogle v. Adams, 12 W. Va. 213, 240 (1877). She was
divested of her title, if at all, by fine or recovery. Shumate v.
Shumate, 78 W. Va. 576, 581, 90 S. E. 824 (1916). In West Virginia, her power to convey and the manner thereof are defined by
cc. 66 and 73, W. VA. CODE. Hence, her power to convey being
purely statutory, at least substantial compliance with the statute
is essential. Rosenour v. Rosenour, supra; Bennett v. Pierce, 45
W. Va. 654, 31 S. E. 972 (1898) ; Gillespie et ux v. Bailey et al., 12
W. Va. 70, 88 (1877) ; Watson v. Michael, 21 W. Va. 568 (1883).
Under the statute, failure of the husband to join in the conveyance
renders it void. Austin v. Brown, 37 W. Va. 634, 17 S. E. 207
(1893); Merritt v. Hughes, 36 W. Va. 356, 15 S. E. 56 (1892);
Cooey v. Porter,22 W. Va. 120 (1883). It is not sufficient that the
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